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Justice Dando and the "Conservative"
Argument for Abolition
JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN*
The 1996 Jerome Hall Lecture, Toward the Abolition of the Death Penalty,' is
an outstanding contribution to the worldwide capital punishment debate by a
most remarkable man. In his lecture, Justice Shigemitsu Dando, who is truly a
leader of the post-war generation of Japanese legal scholars and jurists, draws
upon numerous sources in law, psychology, philosophy, and theology to bolster
his argument that capital punishment is an affront to human dignity and must
therefore be abolished. Justice Dando also relies on his own deeply personal
experiences, as a member of Japan's judiciary, to support his thesis. Without
question; Justice Dando's lecture will cause all those who were fortunate enough
to hear it, or who will now read it in the Indiana Law Journal-Japanese and
Americans, lawyers and non-lawyers, abolitionists and retentionists alike-to
think about the death penalty in new and different ways. It is a moving and
powerful moral statement.
As for myself, in listening to and later thinking about Justice Dando's lecture,
I was most fascinated by two particular aspects of the lecture: one that may
reveal a fundamental difference between present-day Japan and the United
States, and another that underscores the great extent to which our two nations can
nevertheless learn from each other in a universal moral dialogue.
The first aspect concerns the recent development of the abolitionist movement
in Japan and the United States. In his lecture, Justice Dando describes in detail
the way in which the United Nations, speaking for the world community, has
contributed to the abolitionist movement in Japan. As he notes, the steady
progression from the generalized Universal Declaration of Human Rights,2 to the
more specific, but largely toothless, International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 3 to the new Second Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aiming at the Abolition of the Death
Penalty ("Second Optional Protocol"),4 has brought increasing pressure on the
Japanese Government to turn away from capital punishment despite the fact that,
as yet, neither Japan nor the United States has ratified the Second Optional
Protocol. Justice Dando certainly seems to regard these international law trends
as the most promising path toward his ultimate goal of Japanese abolition.
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1. Shigemitsu Dando, Toward the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 72 IND. L.J. 7 (1996).
2. G.A. Res. 217(III)A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
3. G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 53, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
4. G.A. Res. 44/128 U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 206, U.N. Doc. A/44/824
(1989).
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In the United States, on the other hand, the United Nations and its various
statements on capital punishment have been of only passing interest to those
whose views count the most in the American death penalty debate-for example,
judges, political leaders, and the public at large. Although Justices Brennan and
Marshall, our most prominent recent abolitionist jurists, regularly cited
international law in their death penalty opinions,5 few other judges seem to be
influenced, even a little bit, by such authorities. In the political arena, one rarely
hears any discussion about the views of the world community (except for the
occasional, and obviously mistaken, comment that the United States is "the only
modem industrialized democracy that still retains the death penalty"). As for the
public, the average "person on the street" in America is about as unlikely to care
about the United Nations' position on the death penalty as he or she is to ask the
Secretary-General for advice on whom to elect to their local city council, or on
how high their local property taxes should be.
What explains this dramatic difference in perspective? Perhaps it has
something to do with America's history of aloof, if not downright arrogant,
independence in international affairs (although, until very recently, Japan also
had a somewhat similar history of independence). Perhaps it is a reflection of the
self-centeredness of most Americans with respect to the rest of the world, a
general tendency also seen in America's stubborn refusal to adopt the metric
system, and in the fact that so few Americans (other than those whose first
language is not English) ever learn to speak any language other than English.
But perhaps the difference is even more directly attributable to the fact that, in
the United States, matters of crime and punishment-like other so-called "health,
safety, and welfare" issues-have always been viewed as belonging to the states,
rather than to the federal government. Thus, as recently as last year, the United
States Supreme Court struck down a federal criminal statute on the ground that
the behavior regulated, gun possession near a school, was outside the reach of
the federal government and could only be prohibited by the states.6 This decision
must have seemed incomprehensible to most foreign observers, but it was easy
for most Americans to understand, even if they did not agree with the practical
impact of invalidating the statute. If, as even most lay Americans intuitively seem
to grasp, decisions about crime and punishment are generally reserved for state,
as opposed to federal, action, then how can it possibly be that such decisions can
be usurped by an authority even more remote and foreign, such as the
international community, speaking through the United Nations? In short, the
peculiar American concept of federalism, still surprisingly robust and resilient
after more than 200 years, may predispose Americans to think of capital
punishment as a subject that is local rather than national or international in
scope.
But even if Justice Dando's reliance on international law authorities does not
carry much weight for most Americans, another, more important aspect of his
lecture should be seen as a potentially major contribution to the ongoing
American debate on capital punishment.
5. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 389-91 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
6. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
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The first time I heard Justice Dando's lecture, I found myself doing an
intellectual double take. In the last part of his lecture, where he raises the "human
dignity" argument against capital punishment, Justice Dando expresses an
extremely forceful view in support of free will and personal autonomy. He cites
with approval the statement of Georg Stirup that "most of our actions are
voluntary,"7 and rejects the determinism of B.F. Skinner as "the denial of the
autonomous man" and thus "inconsistent with human dignity."8
At first blush, passages like these seemed incongruous to me. After all, in the
United States, the battle lines on capital punishment are drawn in such a way that
abolitionists almost always seek to diminish the defendant's free will, and thus
the defendant's responsibility for his murderous acts. These persons,
usually-though not always-characterized as "liberals," argue, either in general
or in the context of specific capital cases, that the defendant was not solely
responsible for his crime because he was abused as a child, or was allowed to
slip into a destructive cycle of drug or alcohol addiction, or in countless other
ways was failed by the larger society.' Even in non-capital cases, the
overwhelming tendency is for such "liberals" to seek to minimize the defendant's
moral responsibility, sometimes by asserting seemingly specious excuses for
criminal behavior.1 0 Retentionists, on the other hand, almost always assert that
the death penalty can be morally justified on the basis of the defendant's
desert-that is, they argue that the defendant is (or should be held to be) largely
responsible for the terrible harm his acts have caused. These persons,
usually-though not always--characterized as "conservatives," note that not all
persons who suffer similar deprivations turn to a life of crime, and thus that the
defendant must carry the blame for his chosen course of conduct. This is but a
specific application of the general tendency among such "conservatives" to reject
most excuses in favor of a strict application of the penal laws.
Upon further reflection, though, I began to realize that Justice Dando's version
of the "human dignity" argument is an interesting one that is rarely, if ever, heard
in the American debate on capital punishment, and is one that deserves to be
taken most seriously. In his "human dignity" argument, Justice Dando starts from
what most Americans would call a "conservative" premise-that all persons
possess a strong, undeniable freedom of will, which their past circumstances
cannot override, and which makes them largely responsible for the acts they
commit. In America, this usually leads directly to a claim that the defendant
should be held responsible for his acts, and should therefore receive the death
penalty. But Justice Dando, in effect, challenges so-called "conservatives" to
follow their premise all the way to what he sees as its ultimate, albeit startling,
conclusion: if, as the premise asserts, no person is a captive of his past
(hereditary, environmental, or otherwise), then even the person who commits a
7. GEORG K. STORUP, TREATiNG THE "UNTREATABLE" at vii (1968).
8. Dando, supra note 1, at 19.
9. See generally William S. Geimer, Law and Reality in the Capital Penalty Trial, 18
N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 273, 294 (1990-91).
10. See generally ALAN M. DERSHowITz, THE ABUSE EXCUSE (1994) (surveying recent
examples of reliance by defendants on defense of diminished responsibility due to past abuse
or mistreatment).
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capital crime is not a captive of his own (murderous) past, and always retains the
"infinite possibility"" of changing his personality and becoming a worthy
individual, deserving of life, even if in prison.
This is the key to what I call, in my title, Justice Dando's "conservative"
argument for abolition. According to Justice Dando, those who believe strongly
in free will and personal moral responsibility should have the courage of their
convictions, and should recognize that such a belief stands in direct opposition
to any claim that a death row defendant is an "animal" who is beyond redemption
or rehabilitation. This is a powerful argument, with empirical support, at least in
an anecdotal sense; Justice Dando's own personal experiences, with the unnamed
Japanese murderer who reformed himself after meeting Father Candeau, 2
obviously contributed to his deep faith in the inherent potential of all human
beings to improve themselves.
Importantly, Justice Dando distinguishes between the individual's capacity for
self-improvement and the outmoded notion of rehabilitation that dominated
American penal policy at numerous times in the last century. Consistent with the
"conservative" viewpoint, Justice Dando agrees with Georg Stitrup that "[w]e
should not attempt to 'cure' any criminal; he has to develop his own way and
remain himself."' 3 Society's trust, in other words, should be placed not in the
experts (such as psychologists or criminologists) who have, in the past, been
called upon to help "rehabilitate" the criminal, but rather in the inherent potential
of the criminal himself, as a human being with the capacity for self-
determination. Again, Justice Dando's argument here relies on something akin
to faith, but it is a kind of faith that flows logically from the aforementioned
"conservative" premise about free will. Of course, we cannot say with any degree
of confidence that any particular criminal will change and become a better
person, if we do not execute him. However, if we believe strongly enough in free
will, then, according to Justice Dando, we should always be willing to hold open
the possibility of self-improvement, and should therefore resist the temptation to
take the defendant's life.
I believe that Justice Dando's argument represents exactly the kind of
insightful, universally applicable moral reasoning that could help invigorate the
ongoing American debate about capital punishment. Speaking for myself, Justice
Dando's lecture-and especially his argument from "human dignity"-has
challenged me to rethink my own long-standing views about capital punishment,
and has left me feeling much less certain about whether the death penalty can
ever, under any circumstances, be morally justified.
No matter how the American people, or the Japanese people, eventually resolve
the question of capital punishment, it can safely be said that Justice Dando has
left his distinctive mark in yet another area of the law. I am most grateful that he
chose to travel all the way from Tokyo to Bloomington, Indiana, to give us the
benefit of his insights.
11. Dando, supra note 1, at 18.
12. Id. at 16.
13. STGRUP, supra note 7, at 15.
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